The National Defense Authorization Act (NDAA) 2008 recognizes the National Guard Bureau as a Department of Defense Joint Activity. This essay provides recommendations to the National Guard Bureau and the National Guard Joint Force Headquarters on methodologies to nominate, select, train, perform, and sustain joint staff assignments and rotations throughout the country. These recommendations are based on comparisons of current National Guard personnel management operations to the other services' joint personnel operations and doctrine. The pool of joint staff personnel within the Bureau and other interagency partners comes mostly from National Guard states and territories. The future joint personnel management process requires the endorsement or at least consensus support from states Adjutants General. Accordingly, additional evidence is extracted from state-level personnel surveys to support the recommendations. Ultimately, the proposed joint personnel management operations at the state level will improve the overall strategic effectiveness of the entire National Guard, as qualified and experienced joint-qualified National Guard personnel evolve.
NATIONAL GUARD: JOINT ACTIVITY PERSONNEL MANAGEMENT AND SUSTAINMENT
There is no actual barrier in law or policy to the Secretary of Defense's recommending a reserve component officer to the President for appointment as an O-9 in a position of importance and responsibility. Nevertheless, it is arguably unlikely that the Secretary would make such a recommendation if the officer does not meet the joint duty assignment and joint professional military education requirements of the Goldwater-Nichols Act for initial promotion to general and flag officer rank, even though these requirements formally apply only to officers on the active duty list. General may seem too daunting to accomplish. However, the NG could use the lessons learned from the AC struggles to comply with the Goldwater-Nichols Act over the past two decades. Like the NG states, the active duty military services have offered different levels of support to our world-wide joint headquarters. Without trying to identify the most supportive service, it is fair to assert that most services are reluctant to "let go"
of their best officers to perform joint duty. Indeed active duty officers designated to "punch his or her joint ticket" 4 often are apprehensive about leaving their service or attending a joint school, where they encounter other services' cultures. But since NDAA 08 has designed the NGB as a joint activity, the NG, benefitting from the AC transition, can move faster toward formal jointness. This is possible because refined joint doctrine, so it is included in the DoDI 1300.19, which is DoD policy. The DoDI 1300.19 provides the most recent policy for the DoD Joint Officer Management Program. 7 The NGB must frame its joint personnel management actions around this primary document as it moves forward. The most significant points in the DoDI can be gleaned from the "Policy" and "Responsibilities" paragraphs.
It is DoD policy that a "significant number" of personnel obtain progressive joint education, training, and experiences. 8 The obvious objective is to change the culture of stove-piped services by exposing officers to multi-Service, interagency, international, and non-governmental perspectives 9 . To comply with the DoDI and for accountability purposes, joint credit is obtained by progressing through levels of education, training and assignments, which are broken down within four distinct levels: 10 Level I is formal military service training for the officer at the O4 level. Level II is accomplished by completing resident joint professional military education (JPME) at the Joint Combined
Warfare School (JCWS), or non-resident Advanced Joint Professional Military Education (AJPME), or attending resident only Senior Service Colleges. Once the JPME level II is complete, the officer must earn joint qualification points by performing in joint assignments, as specified within the Joint Duty Assignment List (JDAL). Officers have some flexibility in the timing of their joint assignments, but inordinate delays in gaining required experiences can be career-stoppers. Generally speaking, an officer needs between 18 and 36 points obtained from joint experience from the time of graduation of JPME II training. 11 The algorithm within DoDI 1300.19 to accumulate required joint qualification points is calculated through "joint experiences", which consist of assignment "intensity/environment" and "duration/frequency." 12 Further, "discretionary" points may be awarded through joint training, exercises, and other education that contribute to the officers' expertise in joint matters." 13 After accumulating specified joint qualification points the officer is deemed a Joint Qualified Officer (JQO) at Level III. Only JQO's are eligible to be promoted to O7 without a waiver. The final Level, Level IV, is for General or Flag officers. To obtain this level, the General must hold a joint position for at least 24 months (or equivalent) and complete the final training category called CAPSTONE, which is currently for active duty officers only. 14 The NGB J1 published the first edition of the "The Joint Officer Management
Program Handbook" in September 2008. 15 Ultimately, the purpose of the handbook is to provide guidance to the NG Officers to obtain approval from the Joint Chiefs of Staff to gain "retroactive joint credit" 16 from previous joint experiences and education to obtain the JQO designation. This guidance includes joint a equivalency application process.
Due to this publication effort, senior O3's and new O4's can understand the next step in obtaining joint qualification utilizing existing joint education and experience systems. There is no question the ground task force establishes operations for DSCA disasters similar to a combat theater of operations on the battlefield. However, the task force commander quickly modifies the field tactical operations center (TOC) to accommodate and adapt to support multiple agency/multi-service emergency scenarios. In support of DSCA operations, the TOC typically becomes the logistical center of gravity for the civil authority relief effort because of its capability to effectively organize, communicate and operate in a harsh field environment. In a large civilian disaster, the TF CDR's main effort begins with isolation, then civilian evacuation from the disaster area while setting up and manning relief areas and logistical nodes to support these efforts. Thus, the NG TF CDR effectively leads a joint coalition of the willing by having the most resources outside the civilian agencies on the ground of the disaster area. The TF CDR usually deploys with an Air Guard colonel or lieutenant colonel to work in the TF TOC to coordinate air lift support for the main effort. This example details NG organizational efforts to provide defense support to civil authority (DSCA). The expectation of the U.S.
population is that the NG will efficiently and effectively be there in times of crisis.
However, the NG continues to view this mission as a secondary effort that can be accomplished as a bi-product of manning, training, and equipping for war.
The NG is commonly viewed within the DoD as an operational reserve.
However, the battlefield engagements today are typically fought by Joint Task Forces with National Guard individual augmentation to the joint staff. This one fact is enough to support the need to embrace habitual joint personnel constructs within the JFHQ.
Having a consistent and logical structure for a Captain (O3) to develop joint experience and be able to be the next JTF Commander or staff officer is common sense, and should be accomplished through formal joint education and joint assignments. Even though the NG has accomplished everything it has been asked to do with the resources given, the point is the NG has a legitimate purpose to formally resource a joint personnel management structure and ease the pain and lack of creditability of those not joint qualified. This perception can be supported by reflecting the actions of the active duty sending a JTF to New Orleans after Hurricane Katrina on top of NG efforts.
The future effectiveness of the NG officer is enhanced by embracing the overall joint experience through formal joint training; education and monitored rotations through validated joint duty assignments. The JQO has the ability to work with other organizations to get the job done, which already compliments normal practices and life styles of the citizen soldier. However, formal joint training and actual joint assignments within a functional joint activity supported by a JDAL will better develop NG personnel.
Once a stand-alone joint structure is established and sustained, the joint NG officer will understand why sub-cultures resist certain courses of action developed by one service or component. Qualified joint officers will certainly be less stressed and perform more effectively in both NG missions. The development of a NG joint personnel management system affects not only the DSCA response mission, but also, the overall effectiveness of the operational reserve mission of the AC outside the U.S.. Three critical actions must occur to foster the NG to fully embrace and sustain the joint qualification officer:
The JFHQ must build a joint organization like the SJFHQ [CE] and specify the functions to support both the Homeland Defense mission and the AC operational reserve mission;
The Adjutants General in the JFHQs must support the cultivation, nomination, selection, training, assignment, and fair rotation of quality officers through joint assignments; and individual NG officers must have incentives to be a joint qualified officer. Consider the deliberate priority of these critical actions: is it very likely that individual officers will not seek a joint assignment without clear organization structure and purpose? Indeed they probably did not join the NG to be a joint officer, so they need institutional incentive to be attracted to gain qualification. They joined the NG to be a part of the NG culture and 
Field Survey Question State Response
On a scale of 1 to 10 (1 being the best), how do you rate the current Joint Personnel Management system pertaining to the process for nomination, selection, training, performance and rotations within the National Guard?
85% response (below average) 
Way Ahead
The Chief of the National Guard Bureau and the TAG's must decide on a feasible structure that is acceptable and suitable for their state or territory to meet the two NG dominant missions: Title 10 (equip, man, train) as an operational reserve and DSCA support. JP 1.0 provides an effective process for the active component to nominate, select, train, and rotate JQOs. The NG does not need to re-invent this wheel: It should adopt this process to its own needs and situation. The AC also understands the SJFHQ (CE) structure, which facilitates a modular approach to pre-event engagements and post event growth depending on the size of the disaster. Defining the two mission roles and responsibilities can be accomplishment by embracing two distinct roles of the NG. One of the critical functions to sustain joint personnel operations is making personnel assignments a priority. We should be prepared to answer the following question: What if the state or the national level cannot fill the joint structure? One solution is the NG Directors of Joint Staff agree to cross-border support. Once the NG joint personnel automation software consolidates the NG JDAL vacancies and the state joint boards occur, the sense of urgency to fill the vacancies will subside. At that point, the funding of Permanent Changes of Station (PCS), and coordination for administrative support functions must be in place. As suggested in the state survey, with favorable response, the NG "CCDR's" must commit to support the national level requirements to fill the NG Joint Table of Distribution out of the current structure. NGB can determine each State's requirement based on the total strength of the state's force structure compared to the joint NG vacancies. For example, State-X has 4,000 guard personnel therefore, will provide half as many officers as State Y which has 8,000 guard personnel. This will not only guarantee a fill rate for the organizations, but will provide predictability for the joint officer due to consistent rotation times throughout the nation.
The potential shortfall at the state level could be filled by cross-leveling NG officers between states, and even from the United States Army Reserve. Again, the secure web-site provides the conduit to allow for an out-of-state officer to view the vacancies and submit a nomination form with attached scanned evaluations for consideration. If and developing joint qualified personnel. Over a short period of time the NG will eliminate leadership role confusion in the states which will lead to more effective DSCA
